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Religious Freedom and the Common Good
Kathleen A. Brady
As fights over religious liberty in culture war contexts contribute to the
polarization straining our political institutions and public values, few topics
are more important to consider than the relationship between religious
freedom and the common good. This relationship is complex and
multifaceted, and the failure on all sides to explore this relationship deeply
enough has exacerbated our current divisions. This essay, which was
delivered as a talk at a conference on The Question of Religious Freedom at
Loyola University Chicago, seeks to carefully consider this relationship and
focuses, in particular, on four of its facets. First, strong protections for
religious liberty, including robust accommodations when laws and
regulations burden religious practice, are essential to the common good.
Religious freedom does not come at the expense of the common good, and
they are not in opposition. Second, religious freedom must be formulated in
light of the common good. The common good is the good of all of us, and the
right to follow one’s religious conscience in society cannot be unlimited.
Third, religious liberty must be pursued with the common good in mind.
When religious believers seek protections for religious practice, they should
consider the effects of their demands on others, and where conflicts arise,
all sides should work together to develop solutions that minimize burdens on
one another to the greatest extent possible.
Compromises are especially difficult to achieve in culture war contexts
because the opposing sides start with different understandings of the human
goods of marriage, family, and sexuality, and both believe that getting these
understandings right and having them reflected in law and social practice
are essential to the well-being of society. As a result, many proponents of
same-sex marriage and reproductive freedom have resisted religious
accommodations with significant public effects, and many religious
 Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University. This essay is an
annotated and lightly edited version of a presentation given at Loyola University Chicago’s
conference on The Question of Religious Freedom: From John Courtney Murray, S.J. and Vatican
II to the Present. Portions of the essay draw on Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Accommodations and
Third-Party Harms: Constitutional Values and Limits, 106 KY. L.J. 717 (2018), and Kathleen A.
Brady, The Disappearance of Religion from Debates About Religious Accommodation, 20 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1093 (2017). Many thanks to Miguel Díaz for the invitation to examine such an
important topic.
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traditionalists have been unwilling to grant concessions to progressive
agendas in exchange for religious protections. However, this dynamic rests
on too narrow an understanding of the common good. Human dignity
requires room for the exercise of human freedom, and room for freedom will
mean space for competing views. For religious believers in today’s culture
wars, their faith requires even more; they must exercise their rights in ways
that witness to the divine love they are called to imitate and model. Listening,
engagement, and dialogue are necessary to such a witness, and they are also
essential democratic values. Finally, rethinking the relationship between
religious freedom and the common good holds the potential for advancing
the common good more broadly, and this is a fourth facet of their
relationship. If we can move from fights about religious liberty to dialogue
and compromise grounded in mutual understanding, this de-escalation can
serve as a model and sign of hope for reducing our political polarization
more broadly and for charting a new path focused on the common good.
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INTRODUCTION
As fights over religious liberty in culture war contexts contribute to the
deepening polarization straining our political institutions and public
values, few topics are more important to consider than the relationship
between religious freedom and the common good. Today’s circumstances
demand that we think carefully about this relationship, and, indeed, one
of the reasons for the intractability of our current conflicts has been the
failure on all sides to explore this connection deeply enough. In some
cases, the problem has been a narrow focus on one’s own interests and
neglect of competing considerations. More often, though, the problem has
been partial understandings of what is, in fact, a complex and nuanced
relationship. If we are to move forward from our current standoffs, we
need to give the relationship between religious freedom and the common
good more thought, and we need to consider its complexities and multiple
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facets. In what follows, I try my hand at this. There are lessons, I will
argue, for those on all sides of our battles, but much of my attention
focuses on religious believers. What should our demands for religious
freedom entail and how should we pursue our goals?
I. CURRENT CONFLICTS REGARDING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION
It is helpful to begin with some detail about our current conflicts. These
conflicts have concerned what those in the law and religion field refer to
as religious accommodations. No one is arguing that the government
should be able to intentionally burden or suppress religious practice. We
all agree that intentional burdens on religious practice would violate any
reasonable understanding of religious liberty and should be
constitutionally prohibited. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has read
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to prohibit this type of
discrimination.1
However, what about burdens on religious practice that are the result
of neutral, generally applicable laws that are not aimed at religion? If the
government pursues legitimate public purposes, and in doing so,
incidentally burdens religious practice, should we excuse religious
believers from the burdensome requirement? And if the answer is yes,
should we interpret the Constitution to require such an accommodation?
For example, should religious entities with objections to complying with
the contraceptive mandate under the Affordable Care Act be exempted
from the mandate’s requirements or provided another form of effective
accommodation?2 Should for-profit entities with similar objections also
1. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523–24 (1993);
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
2. The contraceptive mandate requires that group health plans include coverage for all FDAapproved women’s contraceptive services at no cost to plan participants. Women’s Preventative
Services Guidelines, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). Implementing regulations finalized in 2012
provided for a narrow exemption designed for churches and their integrated auxiliaries. Group
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services Under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725–26 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified
at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2012); 26 C.F.R. §
54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2012)). (Simplifications of the exemption in 2013 were not intended to
make substantive changes. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873–74 (July 2, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2017))).
This exemption left out many religious organizations with objections to covering some or all
contraceptives in their employee health plans. In response to public outcry from across the political
and theological spectrum, federal regulators developed an accommodation designed to retain
contraceptive coverage for the plan participants of objecting religious groups but shift its provision
and cost to these groups’ insurance providers. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 (2017); 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.715-2713A (2017); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2017)) (finalizing this accommodation in
2013); Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg.
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receive relief?3 In the context of same-sex marriage, should religious
entities have to comply with prohibitions against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation when providing adoption services, when
hiring, or when providing spousal benefits to employees? 4 Should
41,318, 41,322–23 (July 14, 2015) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1) (2017); 29 C.F.R. §§
2590.715-2713A(b)(1), (c)(1) (2017); 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.9815-2713A(b)(1), (c)(1) (2017))
(modifying the notice requirements of the accommodation). While the government’s
accommodation was acceptable to many religious organizations, others found it unsatisfactory, and
litigation over the mandate has continued for years. In October 2017, the Trump administration
issued new interim final rules providing broad exemptions for religious groups and other employers
with religious objections to the mandate, and it finalized these rules in November 2018. See
Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under
the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§
147.131, 147.132; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A). The administration
also adopted slightly narrower protections for employers with nonreligious moral objections to the
mandate. Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services
Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 147.131, 147.133; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A). Legal challenges
to the interim final rules resulted in preliminary injunctions enjoining the administration from
enforcing them. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D. Pa. 2017), appeals filed,
No. 17-3752 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2017), and No. 18-1253 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2018); California v. Health
& Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 813–14 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, California v. Azar, 2018 WL 6566752 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018) (affirming preliminary
injunction insofar as it applies to California and other plaintiff states but vacating portion of
injunction barring enforcement of the rules nationwide). The plaintiffs in these cases now plan to
challenge the final rules.
3. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), the Supreme Court construed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012), to require an
exemption for three closely held for-profit businesses owned and operated by families with
religious objections to covering contraceptives they viewed as potential abortifacients. Hobby
Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. at 2759–60. According to the Court, the mandate placed a substantial
burden on religious exercise, and the government had less restrictive means of achieving its
objectives. Id. at 2775–82. For example, the government could have extended the accommodation
that it had developed for religious nonprofits with “precisely zero” effects on plan participants. Id.
at 2759–60, 2780–82. The government took this step after the Court’s decision. See Coverage of
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,323–28. In
November 2018, the Trump administration finalized new rules that permit nonprofit and for-profit
employers with religious objections to covering some or all contraceptives to choose between using
this accommodation or opting for a full exemption. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations
for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. at
57,537.
4. States that recognized same-sex marriage legislatively prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), afforded religious groups limited exemptions from
antidiscrimination rules. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Politics of Accommodation: The
American Experience with Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
AND GAY RIGHTS: EMERGING CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 132, app. 6.B, at
174–77 (Timothy Samuel Shah et al. eds., 2016). In most of these states, religious organizations
cannot be forced to provide goods, services, and accommodations related to the solemnization or
celebration of same-sex marriage or be penalized for failing to do so. See id. A few of these states
protect religiously affiliated adoption and foster care programs with objections to placing children
with same-sex couples, at least as long as these programs do not receive government funding. See
id. (citing statutory protections in Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, and Rhode Island). A number
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wedding vendors with religious objections to celebrating same-sex
marriages be excused from antidiscrimination rules? 5 All of these cases
raise questions of religious accommodation. Should we accommodate
religious practice when the demands of faith conflict with the commands
of the state, and if the answer is yes, when and to what extent?
Questions related to religious accommodation usually arise when
religious practices are out of step with majoritarian norms, and religious
exemptions or other forms of accommodation function to make space for
of other states have also enacted protections for religiously affiliated adoption agencies, most of
which have been adopted very recently. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-10D-1 to 26-10D-7 (West, Westlaw
through Act 2018-579); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5322 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 710.23g (Westlaw through P.A.2018, No. 348 of 2018 Reg. Sess.); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 11-62-5(2) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-8-112
(Westlaw through 2018 2d Reg. Sess.); FY 2018–19 General Appropriations Act, No. 264, § 38.29,
2018 S.C. Acts 201, 361, available at https://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess122_20172018/appropriations2018/tap1b.pdf; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-6-36 to 26-6-50 (Westlaw through
2018 Reg. and Spec. Sess.); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE §§ 45.001 to 45.010 (West, Westlaw through
2017 Reg. and 1st Called Sess.); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1709.3 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and
Sp. Sess. I). In recent years, a few states have adopted provisions to exempt religious organizations
from rules prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. MISS. CODE
ANN. § 11-62-5(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (providing
that the state and its political subdivisions cannot discriminate against a religious organization
because of employment decisions based on the conviction that marriage is the union of one man
and one woman or that sexual relations are reserved to such a marriage); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
34A-5-102, 34A-5-106(1)(a)(i)(I)–(J) (LexisNexis, Westlaw through 2018 2d Spec. Sess.) (adding
sexual orientation and gender identity to state’s prohibition on employment discrimination and
expanding exemption for religious employers from the statute). However, most states leave these
types of conflicts unaddressed.
5. Only one state has legislation exempting these wedding vendors from antidiscrimination
rules. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5(5) (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
Cases involving bakers, florists, wedding photographers, and others have popped up across the
country. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (baker); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)
(custom artwork for weddings), petition for review granted, No. CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Nov. 20,
2018); Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk Cty. Apr.
3, 2014) (art gallery owned by couple and used to plan, facilitate, and host wedding ceremonies);
Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (wedding photographer), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016) (farm
used to host wedding ceremonies); Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash.
2017) (florist), petition for cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2671
(2018). In Masterpiece Cakeshop, decided this past term, the Supreme Court held that the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission failed to consider a Christian baker’s objection to designing cakes for
same-sex weddings with the religious neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause. 138 S. Ct. at
1729–32. According to the Court, in rejecting the baker’s claims, the Commission demonstrated
hostility to the baker’s religious views by expressing this hostility in its proceedings, id. at 1729–
30, 1732, and also by treating the baker’s case differently than others where it had allowed bakers
to decline to make cakes with messages of religious opposition to same-sex marriage, id. at 1729–
32. The Court’s decision was narrow. The Court did not resolve the broader constitutional claims
raised by the baker and by wedding vendors in other cases, and it is not clear how the Court would
decide a case without the religious hostility present in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
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religious minorities in the larger political community. Part of what makes
our current conflicts over religious accommodation so fierce is that they
are occurring against a backdrop of rapid social change. As the tide of the
culture wars has turned against those with traditional views regarding
marriage, family, and sexuality, religious believers and institutions
adhering to those views have increasingly sought exemptions from laws
and regulations that reflect and promote new norms. These efforts have
met resistance from those who fear that religious accommodations will
undermine these new norms and harm those that new laws are designed
to protect.6 Religious believers, in turn, have decried threats to religious
liberty, and they have demanded the freedom to follow religious
principles in their private and public lives.7 The stakes on both sides are
high.
The bitterness of today’s fights is also due, in part, to the publicness of
our conflicts. Constitutional requirements for religious accommodation
are narrow.8 This was not always the case. For many years, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to
afford robust protection when neutral laws of general applicability
impinged on religious practice.9 Under the Court’s rule, religious
believers were entitled to an exemption from laws that substantially
burdened religious practice unless the government could show that the
application of the law to the believer was necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.10 In 1990, in the landmark case Employment
Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court reversed course, and it held that in
all but a few categories of cases, religious believers are not entitled to
exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability. 11 Religious
accommodation, the Court stated, is a matter for legislatures.12
Six years ago, the Court pulled back somewhat from Smith when it
recognized what has been referred to as the ministerial exception.13 The
6. For a description of this dynamic, see generally Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the
Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2014).
7. See, e.g., In Defense of Religious Freedom: A Statement by Evangelicals and Catholics
Together, FIRST THINGS (Mar. 2012), available at https://www.firstthings.com/article/2012/03/indefense-of-religious-freedom (last visited Nov. 20, 2018); Our First, Most Cherished Liberty: A
Statement on Religious Liberty, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (2012), available at
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Our_First_Most_Cherished_
Liberty.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) [hereinafter Our First, Most Cherished Liberty].
8. See infra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
9. The Court adopted this approach in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–07 (1963), and
affirmed it in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1972).
10. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
11. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–85 (1990).
12. Id. at 890.
13. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012).

2018]

Religious Freedom and the Common Good

143

First Amendment, the Court held, bars government interference with a
religious group’s choice of clergy even when the interference results from
neutral, generally applicable employment discrimination laws.14
However, it is unclear how much further this autonomy for religious
groups might extend. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, decided this past term, there were intriguing hints
that a majority of the Court’s justices might further narrow Smith in the
future.15 However, whether the Court will do so and in what ways remain
unclear.
Sometimes religious believers can frame infringements on religious
practice as violations of other constitutional guarantees, such as the First
Amendment’s right to free speech. For example, wedding vendors who
have resisted the application of laws prohibiting discrimination in public
accommodations have argued that requirements to provide services that
celebrate same-sex marriages involve compelled expression in violation
of the Free Speech Clause.16 The Supreme Court sidestepped this issue
in Masterpiece Cakeshop when it delivered a narrow win for a Colorado
baker on the ground that the state’s civil rights commission had
demonstrated hostility to the baker’s religious views and, thus, failed to
consider his case with the religious neutrality required by the Free
Exercise Clause.17 However, the Court indicated that a successful free
speech challenge to the application of public accommodations laws
would be narrow,18 and most claims for religious exemptions from
neutral, generally applicable laws cannot readily be framed as violations
of free speech guarantees or other constitutional provisions. Thus, for the
most part today, religious accommodation is the responsibility of
legislative and administrative actors, and this has led to bitter public
battles about what our rules should be.
14. Id. at 188–90.
15. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24
(2018) (stating that “[t]he Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner
of a business serving the public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by
generally applicable laws”) (emphasis added); id. at 1724 (referring to the “question of when the
free exercise of . . . religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power” as “delicate”);
see also id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (observing that “Smith remains controversial in many
quarters”).
16. See, e.g., id. at 1726; Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 431–32,
437 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018), petition for review granted, No. CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Nov. 20, 2018);
Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422, 431 (App. Div. 2016); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock,
309 P.3d 53, 63, 69 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); Telescope Media Grp. v.
Lindsey, 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1118–20 (D. Minn. 2017), appeal filed, No. 17-3352 (8th Cir. Oct.
30, 2017); Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 556 (Wash. 2017), petition for cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
17. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–32.
18. Id. at 1727–29.

144

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 50

Examining today’s controversies in light of the relationship between
religious freedom and the common good is such a compelling exercise
because it broadens our vantage points. Those who have resisted religious
accommodations in culture war contexts have tended to see religious
accommodation as something that comes at the expense of the common
good, and they have focused on the costs of accommodation. They do not
oppose narrow accommodations with few public effects—for example,
the Obama administration’s initial decision to finalize the contraceptive
mandate with only a narrow exemption designed for churches and their
integrated auxiliaries—or the administration’s later accommodation for
religious nonprofits, which preserved seamless contraceptive coverage
for the female employees of objecting groups.19 However, there has been
strong opposition to accommodations that might retard the progress of
new norms or place significant costs on third parties like women and
same-sex couples.20 Indeed, some scholars have argued that religious
accommodations with significant or meaningful third-party costs violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.21 That is, such
accommodations are not only undesirable as a matter of public policy;
they are also unconstitutional.
For their part, religious believers in these conflicts have tended to focus
on their own liberties. They have often sought broad protections for
religious conscience while paying much less attention to the concerns of
those who are affected by these accommodations. For example, with the
new influence of religious conservatives in the Trump administration,
federal regulators have adopted new rules regarding the contraceptive
19. For these provisions, see supra note 2.
20. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); Lawrence G. Sager, In
the Name of God: Structural Injustice and Religious Faith, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 585 (2016);
Elizabeth Sepper, The Risky Business of RFRAs after Hobby Lobby, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF
RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 17 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018); Nelson Tebbe, Religion and
Marriage Equality Statutes, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2015).
21. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 343, 349, 361–62 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women:
Why an Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 51, 52, 54 (2014); Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE
BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 328, 329–30, 332–33 (Susanna Mancini
& Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) [hereinafter Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?]; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The
Establishment Clause and the Contraception Mandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html; Nelson Tebbe, Richard
Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What
Counts As A Burden on Employees?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013), https://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html.
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mandate that provide broad exemptions for those opposed to complying
with the mandate.22 However, there is no assistance in these new rules
for female employees who will lose contraceptive coverage as a result of
the rules. Newly proposed revisions to the federal government’s Title X
regulations would allow these women to qualify as members of lowincome families eligible for free contraceptives at Title X-supported
centers.23 However, these new regulations would not guarantee access to
free contraceptives, and they do not address the goal of mandate
proponents to minimize the logistical obstacles to obtaining
contraceptives.
Addressing the relationship between religious freedom and the
common good is important and timely because it requires us to consider
the issue of religious liberty from the perspectives of the many
individuals and groups that may be involved. All vantage points must be
taken into account.
II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF THE COMMON GOOD
In the Catholic tradition, the common good has been described as “the
sum of those conditions of social life by which individuals, families, and
groups can achieve their own fulfillment in a relatively thorough and
ready way.”24 In Dignitatis Humanae, its Declaration on Religious
Liberty, the Second Vatican Council (the Council) stated that these

22. The new rules include provisions for religious objectors, Religious Exemptions and
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act,
83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.131, 147.132; 29 C.F.R.
§ 2590.715-2713A, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A), as well as slightly narrower protections for
employers with nonreligious moral objections to providing contraceptive coverage, Moral
Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the
Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 147.131,
147.133; 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A, 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A). For further discussion,
including legal challenges to these rules, see supra notes 2–3.
23. Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-6 (2012), funds family
planning services through grants to public and nonprofit entities across the country. For these
proposed regulations, see Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg.
25,502, 25,502, 25,529–30 (proposed June 1, 2018) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59). Under
existing Title X regulations, low-income families can include those with incomes above 100 percent
of the most recent federal Poverty Guidelines if the project director determines that the family is
unable, for good reasons, to pay for services. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (2017). The proposed revisions
further elaborate, as an example, that “a woman can be considered from a ‘low-income family’ if
she has health insurance coverage through an employer which does not provide the contraceptive
services sought by the woman because it has a sincerely held religious or moral objection to
providing such coverage.” 83 Fed. Reg. at 25,530 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59.2).
24. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE
CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD para. 74 (1965), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE
DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 166, 216 (David J. O’Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
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conditions include especially the protection of human rights,25 and it
identified religious freedom as the highest of human rights.26 Religious
liberty, the Council argued, includes the right of believers to follow their
religious convictions in society and of religious groups to organize
themselves according to religious principle.27 No one, the Council stated,
should be “forced to act against [their] [religious] convictions [or] . . . be
restrained from acting in accordance with [these] convictions . . . in
private or in public, alone or in associations with others.”28 The Council
affirmed religious accommodation as a responsibility of legislators and
administrators,29 and also as something that should be sanctioned by
constitutional law.30
The Council rested its case for religious freedom on the requirements
of human dignity.31 The human person is created with reason and free
will and made for responsible freedom.32 We have a desire and obligation
to seek the truth, especially in religious matters, and we must follow the
truth as we come to know it.33 Religious freedom is the highest of human
rights because it concerns the highest of human duties.34
America’s tradition of religious freedom rests in significant part on a
similar justification. Those in our founding era recognized and respected
the capacity of persons to seek the divine and their desire to follow
conscience where it leads. They also recognized that the demands that
religion makes on believers transcend those of the temporal order.35
Religious believers, James Madison wrote, enter society with a higher
“allegiance” to “the Governour of the Universe.”36 Thomas Jefferson
agreed: “[T]he relations which exist between man and his Maker, and the
duties resulting from those relations, are the most interesting and
25. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE: DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY para. 6 (1965), reprinted in 1 VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST
CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 799, 803–04 (Austin Flannery, O.P. ed., 1984).
26. Id. para. 15, at 812.
27. Id. paras. 3–4, at 802–03.
28. Id. para. 2, at 800.
29. Id. para. 6, at 804.
30. Id. para. 2, at 800, para. 13, at 810, para. 15, at 812.
31. Id. paras. 2–3, at 800–02, paras. 9–12, at 806–09.
32. Id. para. 2, at 801.
33. Id.
34. Id. para. 15, at 812.
35. According to the Second Vatican Council, “the private and public acts of religion by which
men direct themselves to God according to their convictions transcend of their very nature the
earthly and temporal order of things.” Id. para. 3, at 802. Founding-era statements were similar. See
infra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
36. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1973).
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important to every human being.”37 America’s long tradition of religious
accommodation and the thousands of religious exemptions that exist in
our laws today reflect this solicitude for conscience in conflicts with the
state.
The centrality of religious freedom to the common good is, then, one
facet of the relationship between them. Religious freedom does not come
at the expense of the common good as those who have resisted religious
accommodation in culture war contexts increasingly suggest. They are
not in opposition.38 To view it this way is to pay insufficient attention to
the ways in which religious freedom is a requirement of human nature
and its dignity.
Indeed, to overlook this requirement risks the kind of instability and
division we see today. Those in the American founding era respected
conscience in conflicts with the state, and they also recognized that
forcing believers to violate their conscience will result in resentment,
resistance, and bitter strife. The European experience gave them a close
example of this danger, and their concerns have a renewed salience today.
Indeed, our deepening polarization has been fueled, in part, by our
continuing standoffs over culture war issues. The Catholic Church has
drawn the connection between justice and peace,39 and in recent years we
have seen the kind of civic division that can arise when believers perceive
threats to their ability to follow the demands of their faith.
There are additional connections between religious freedom and the
common good. Forcing religious believers to violate their conscience
weakens moral integrity, and in so doing, it undermines moral
dispositions that are essential for democratic government. The betrayal
of conscience “beget[s] habits of hypocrisy and meanness,” Thomas
Jefferson observed as part of his defense of religious liberty, 40 and the
loss of public virtue affects us all.
Protections for religious groups, in particular, have additional benefits
37. Fourth Report of Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (Oct. 7, 1822), in EARLY
HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, AS CONTAINED IN THE LETTERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON AND JOSEPH C. CABELL, HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED 470, 474 (J.W. Randolph ed., 1856).
Thomas Jefferson was Rector of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia at the time. Id.
at 476.
38. For a description of this growing view, see Laycock, supra note 6, at 869–77.
39. POPE FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’: ON CARE FOR OUR COMMON HOME para. 157, at 76 (United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops) (2015); POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS para. 5,
at 13 (Pauline Books & Media) (1991); POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS para. 167 (1963),
reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE, supra note 24, at 131,
159.
40. Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted in 2 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1777 TO 18 JUNE 1779, illus. facing 305 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1950).
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for the larger community. As the United States Catholic bishops wrote in
2012 in their statement Our First, Most Cherished Liberty, religious
organizations serve the common good through a broad range of charitable
activities, and they do so creatively and with a unique witness.41
America’s religious groups have always been an important source of
public values, and this contribution has included this witness. Religious
diversity has been a central aspect of American pluralism, and it has
played an important role in the process through which we have
continuously deepened, challenged, and renewed our public norms.
III. DEFINING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN LIGHT OF THE COMMON GOOD
However, if religious freedom is an essential aspect of the common
good, it must also be formulated in light of the common good, and this is
a second facet of their relationship. The right to follow one’s religious
convictions in society cannot be unlimited. The common good, as Pope
Benedict XVI put it in the vernacular, is the “good of ‘all of us,’”42 and
religious freedom cannot be an entitlement to disregard legal rules no
matter the effects of doing so on others. In Dignitatis Humanae, the
Second Vatican Council identified three types of limits: (1) limits to
protect the rights of others; (2) limits to safeguard the public peace; and
(3) limits to protect public morality.43 These are requirements of what the
Council referred to as the “public order,” which is itself a basic aspect of
the common good.44
There are parallels between these limits and the limits on religious
freedom envisioned by Americans in the founding era. For example, as
states drafted their constitutions in the new nation, all three of these types
of limits appeared in their protections for religious liberty, though limits
where religious practice collides with public morality were the least
common.45 James Madison, one of America’s strongest defenders of
religious liberty, similarly spoke of limits where the rights of others and
the public peace or the safety of the state are at stake.46
41. Our First, Most Cherished Liberty, supra note 7.
42. POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE para. 7, at 13 (The Word Among Us Press)
(2009).
43. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 25, para. 7, at 805.
44. Id.
45. See KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW:
RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 237–38 (2015).
46. James Madison, Proposal for the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), reprinted in 1 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 174, 175 (William T. Hutchinson & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1962)
(proposing that the free exercise of religion be “unpunished and unrestrained by the magistrate,
[u]nless the preservation of equal liberty and the existence of the State are manifestly endangered”);
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
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But, of course, the devil is in the details, and if the rights of others or
the other aspects of the public order are defined too broadly, there will be
little space left for religious exemptions. Public morality is a particularly
expansive concept, and, indeed, it is part of what citizens in a democracy
argue about. Today’s culture wars are fights about how we should
understand the basic aspects of public morality, and those who have
resisted religious accommodations do so in part because they worry that
religious exemptions will undermine important public norms. They also
argue that accommodations that deprive third parties of legal benefits like
free contraceptive coverage unfairly—and indeed—unconstitutionally
impinge on the rights of others.
Defining the limits to religious freedom must also grapple with another
challenge that arises from the unique nature of the right. If religious
believers have an obligation to follow truth as they come to know it and
the demands of religious conscience transcend the temporal order, the
limits we draw must be consistent with the primacy of religious concerns.
Not just any competing interest, and indeed not just any weighty
competing interest, can justify limits on religious freedom.
In practice, it is important to distinguish between the two different
contexts in which the question of limits arises. First, to the extent that we
recognize a right of exemption protected as a matter of constitutional law,
what should our limits to this right be? Second, when legislatures and
administrators act to accommodate religious exercise, are there any limits
that restrict what they can do to protect religious liberty? In recent years,
law and religion scholars have tended to focus on the second question—
that is, on limits to legislative and administrative accommodations.47
MADISON 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (arguing for the “immunity of Religion from civil
jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on private rights or the public peace”); Letter
from James Madison to Rev. Adams (1832), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at
484, 487 (advocating “an entire abstinence of the Govt. from interference in any way whatever,
beyond the necessity of preserving public order, & protecting each sect agst. trespasses on its legal
rights by others”).
47. A number of scholars have argued that the Establishment Clause, and perhaps also the Free
Exercise Clause, prohibit religious accommodations that place significant costs on third parties.
See infra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. Other scholars envision the First Amendment’s
limitations on religious accommodation much more narrowly. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious
Exemptions and Third-Party Harms, FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV., Oct. 2016, at 50, 51; Kathleen A.
Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-Party Harms: Constitutional Values and Limits, 106
KY. L.J. 717, 738–49 (2018); Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the
Establishment Clause?, 106 KY. L.J. 603, 604–06 (2018); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 41–49 (2014); Marc
DeGirolami, On the Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause,
MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/
exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-the-establishment-clause.html; Eugene Volokh,
Would Granting an Exemption from the Employer Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause?,
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They have done so both because the Supreme Court’s decision to reject a
constitutional right of exemption seems deeply entrenched in the Court’s
jurisprudence, and also because—and this is related—legislative and
administrative accommodations are where much of the action is today.48
Our fights about religious liberty today are primarily about legislative and
administrative protections, and this is where the pushback against
religious accommodation has focused.49
I too will focus on this second question, but at the outset it is important
to point out a critical difference between these two contexts. A
constitutional right of exemption has the effect of carving out mandatory
exceptions to rules that have been adopted by democratic majorities to
serve other legitimate public purposes. It is a right with potentially farreaching implications especially in a pluralistic society like our own, and,
indeed, it was these far-reaching implications that contributed to the
decision of the Court to reject the right in Smith.50 The Smith Court feared
that a constitutional right of exemption would risk chaos in a religiously
diverse society.51 By contrast, in the context of legislative or
administrative accommodations, it is political actors who are making
room for religious minorities in their own regulatory frameworks. Their
decisions to accommodate religious practice will include a balance of
factors, including a consideration of the costs involved.
When it comes to a constitutional right of exemption, I believe that the
Second Vatican Council was correct to affirm the right and identify limits
where religious exemptions would endanger the public peace or infringe
upon the rights of others, at least where these rights have an importance
commensurate with the right to religious freedom.52 The state plays an
important role in protecting religious believers from interference from
one another, as it does in protecting human rights in general, and this role
requires a state whose existence is secure as well as basic conditions of
public peace and order. Consequently, religious believers should not be
entitled to exemptions where the application of the government’s rule is

THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-grantingexemption-employer-mandate-violate-establishment-clause/.
48. For current battles over legislative and administrative accommodations in culture war
contexts, see supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion of this pushback, see Douglas Laycock, The Campaign against Religious
Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 231 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds.,
2016).
50. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885–90 (1990).
51. Id. at 888–90.
52. For a discussion of the Second Vatican Council’s teaching on religious liberty, see supra
notes 25–34, 43–44 and accompanying text.
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necessary to secure these conditions.53 Likewise, exemptions should not
be required where the application of the government’s rule to the believer
is necessary to prevent meaningful intrusion on the persons, property, or
physical liberties of others; on their intellectual or spiritual freedoms; or
on legal rights or benefits designed to secure life, health, safety, property,
and economic opportunity.54 These are basic rights and benefits that
protect and nourish the conditions for meaningful and voluntary decisionmaking, including about religious matters.55
On the other hand, the preservation of public morality is not, in my
view, a sufficient reason to limit religious freedom. Public morality is
deeply contested in American society today, and our disagreements often
follow along religious lines. Limits on the basis of public morality risk
disadvantaging religious groups with unpopular views. To be sure, some
aspects of public morality will be essential for the peace and safety of the
state or protecting the rights of others. However, the preservation of
public morality, standing alone, should not serve as the basis for
restricting religious liberty in a deeply pluralistic society.
What about where the political community itself decides to make
sacrifices for religious freedom? What, if any, legal constraints should
there be when legislatures or administrators take steps to accommodate
religious practice? As I observed earlier, there are thousands of religious
exemptions in American laws today, and these exemptions frequently
place costs on others. Some of these costs are substantial; some are much
less significant. Some are widely shared among the members of the public
at large, and others are borne primarily by specific segments of the
population. Many have a long pedigree. A familiar example is the clergypenitent privilege. In the early nineteenth century, a New York court
interpreted the free exercise guarantee of New York’s constitution to
protect a Catholic priest who refused to disclose the contents of a
confession in response to a subpoena in a criminal case.56 The legislature
followed with a statutory protection,57 and now laws in all fifty states
recognize some version of the clergy-penitent privilege.58 The clergy53. I have defended this view in BRADY, supra note 45, at 238–41.
54. I have defended this limit in id. at 241–44.
55. See id. at 246.
56. See People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reprinted in Privileged Communications
to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 199–209 (1955).
57. Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 56, at 213.
58. Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532–33 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[a]ll fifty
states have enacted statutes ‘granting some form of testimonial privilege to clergy-communicant
communications’”) (quoting Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1556 (1985)). For further discussion of this privilege, see 1 KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 246–60 (2006).
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penitent privilege can significantly handicap the legal system’s discovery
of truth, and it can greatly disadvantage litigants who would benefit from
the excluded testimony. However, we have thought it worth the cost.
In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that the
Establishment Clause prohibits religious accommodations that place
significant burdens on third parties at least if those impacted constitute a
discrete and identifiable group,59 and some also believe that these
burdens violate the Free Exercise Clause as well.60 These scholars argue
that forcing third parties to bear the costs of religious accommodation
imposes the accommodated faith on nonadherents61 and is analogous to
coercive tax support for favored faiths.62 In my view, both of these
arguments strain the concepts of religious coercion and tax support for
religion. Religious coercion means something more than bearing the costs
of religious accommodation. It means being forced to participate in or
affirm a faith that is not one’s own or to abandon one’s own practices.
Third-party costs associated with religious accommodations are also very
different than government support for a privileged faith. Religious
accommodations facilitate free exercise. They are designed to make room
for adherents of minority faiths in our larger political community, not to
advance favored faiths or promote religious conformity. They make space
for practices that depart from majoritarian norms. The Supreme Court has
said that religious accommodations must “take adequate account” of the
costs they place on others,63 but the effect of this new proposal would be
to invalidate many of the religious accommodations in American law
today and to severely restrict the sacrifices we can make in the future.
This rule does not fit with our historical tradition of religious
accommodation or the values that underlie it.
I believe that there are constitutional limits on legislative and
59. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 50, 55 (2017);
Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215,
215 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017); Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 21, at 332–33.
61. TEBBE, supra note 60, at 53; Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of
Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby’s Puzzling Footnote 37, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 49 at 323, 325; Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 21, at 332–33, 336; see also Gedicks &
Koppelman, supra note 21, at 66 (referring to burden shifting resulting from a religious exemption
from the contraceptive mandate as “religious oppression of others”).
62. TEBBE, supra note 60, at 52; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 21, at 363; Gedicks & Van
Tassell, supra note 61, at 329, 335.
63. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014) (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720).
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administrative accommodations that place costs on others. 64 However,
these limits must make sense as Free Exercise or Establishment Clause
violations, and they must be consistent with our tradition of making
sacrifices—sometimes great sacrifices—to protect religious liberty. This
means that these limits will be narrow. Rather than a general rule, such
as a general rule against third-party harms, we can better balance free
exercise values and concerns about third-party harm if we identify
specific situations that involve clear Free Exercise or Establishment
Clause violations. The Court has identified two in particular. Religious
accommodations violate the First Amendment if they coerce third parties
to participate in religious practices that they do not share,65 and if they
force third parties to affirm faiths that are not their own.66
Accommodations that would require religious participation or
affirmation clearly violate free exercise and disestablishment norms.
I would add another constitutional limit that has particular relevance
for our current fights over religious accommodation. Accommodations
involve unconstitutional religious favoritism if they place serious burdens
on unpopular, marginalized, or other politically disadvantaged groups in
circumstances where less burdensome alternatives have not been
explored or the breadth of the exemption exceeds what is necessary to
meet religious needs.67 Americans have made great sacrifices to protect
religious liberty, but burdens like these would not be tolerated if the
positions of those benefited and burdened were reversed.
There will not be many accommodations like this, but there will be
some. For example, Mississippi’s recent legislation protecting businesses
with religious or moral objections to providing marriage-related services
to same-sex couples is overbroad in this way.68 The statute goes well
beyond the types of conflicts that have arisen in recent years. The
conflicts that have arisen have involved small business owners personally
providing wedding-related services that are closely connected to the
celebration of marriages, such as wedding photography, floral design, and
64. For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 47, at 738–43.
65. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (rejecting an exemption for Amish
employers from the requirement to withhold and pay Social Security taxes where the effect of this
exemption would be to force non-Amish workers to follow the Amish way of life regarding
retirement security). For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 47, at 740–41.
66. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 708–11 (1985) (striking down Connecticut
statute that gave workers an “absolute and unqualified” right not to work on their chosen Sabbath
and, thus, required employers to advantage Sabbath observance over other religious and
nonreligious interests and needs). For further discussion, see Brady, supra note 47, at 741.
67. For further discussion of this position, see Brady, supra note 47, at 742–43.
68. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5(5) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg. and 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
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cake design.69 The individuals involved in these cases have argued that
the provision of these services for same-sex weddings would not only
facilitate marriages that violate their religious beliefs but would also
celebrate and affirm them.70 The scope of Mississippi’s statute is much
broader. Its protections extend to closely held businesses of any size and
cover the provision of a broad range of goods and services, including, for
example, car rentals and jewelry sales.71 In addition, under the law,
businesses with religious or moral objections to serving same-sex couples
are entitled to exemptions from otherwise applicable antidiscrimination
rules regardless of the ability of same-sex couples to obtain weddingrelated services from other comparable providers. There is nothing wrong
with efforts to accommodate the needs of religious traditionalists who
object to personally providing services affirming marriages they view as
religiously prohibited. However, Mississippi’s statute does so at
potentially great expense to an unpopular group in the state and in a way
that exceeds what believers need.
IV. PURSUING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM WITH THE COMMON GOOD IN MIND
However, if constitutional limits on legislative and administrative
accommodations will be narrow, there is yet another question to address,
and this question—a normative question—is, in my view, the most
important today. When accommodations for religious practice implicate
competing interests and values, how should we approach the important
project of protecting religious liberty? As religious believers, in
particular, what should our demands for religious freedom entail, and
how should we pursue our goals? In Dignitatis Humanae, the Second
Vatican Council had an answer: “In availing of any freedom, men must
respect the moral principle of personal and social responsibility.” 72 They
must “have regard for the rights of others, their own duties to others and

69. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(cake design); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2018)
(custom artwork for weddings), petition for review granted, No. CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Nov. 20,
2018); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016) (farm hosting wedding
ceremonies); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (wedding
photography), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d
543 (Wash. 2017) (floral design), petition for cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded,
138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
70. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724, 1726; Brush & Nib, 418 P.3d at 431–32,
437; Gifford, 23 N.Y.S.3d at 431; Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 63, 69; Arlene’s Flowers, 389
P.3d at 550, 556.
71. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-62-5(5)(a)–(b), 11-62-17(3) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Reg.
and 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
72. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 25, para. 7, at 805.
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the common good of all.”73 And “[a]ll men must be treated with justice
and humanity.”74 What the Council points to here is yet another facet of
the relationship between religious freedom and the common good.
Religious freedom is not only essential to the common good and
something that must be formulated in light of the common good. It must
also be pursued with the common good in mind.
Pursuing religious freedom with the common good in mind means that
religious believers must be careful not to focus solely on their own
liberties when they seek protections for religious freedom. They must
also consider the effects of their demands on others and the larger
community. Likewise, those impacted by the protections religious
believers seek must also consider the value of religious liberty. When
conflicts arise, all of those involved should work together to seek
solutions that avoid or minimize burdens on one another to the greatest
extent possible. Each side must carefully consider what it really needs
and not insist upon advantages that are not really necessary. The goal
should be to reach mutually acceptable compromises whenever possible,
and achieving this goal will require an openness to listening and hearing
what others have to say, a commitment to dialogue, a willingness to work
together in good faith, and a recognition that compromise requires a
process of give and take. No one can expect to get everything they want,
but each side should be willing to address what is most important to the
other.
In my own academic work, I have argued that our constitutional rules
regarding the requirements and limits of religious accommodation should
foster such compromises. For example, if, as I have proposed, legislative
or administrative accommodations violate the Establishment Clause
when they place serious costs on a vulnerable group in circumstances
where alternatives have not been considered or the accommodation is
overbroad, there will be incentives for religious believers to examine
what they really need and engage with others about less burdensome
alternatives.75 Many of the exemptions in our laws reflect compromises,
and give and take has been part of our tradition of religious liberty from
the beginning. In the American founding era, for example, most states
exempted religious pacifists from compulsory military service, but
conscientious objectors were required to secure a substitute, pay a
financial equivalent, or perform alternative service.76 Quakers were also
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Brady, supra note 47, at 748–49.
76. See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1808 (2006).
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exempted from oath requirements, but they had to affirm instead.77
Compromises like these account for both the value of religious liberty
and the effects of accommodation on others.
However, there is a reason that we have had such difficulty
compromising with one another in culture war contexts. In these contexts,
religious believers and their opponents disagree with one another about
the common good itself. They start with divergent understandings of the
human goods of marriage, family, and sexuality, and both sides believe
that getting these understandings right and having them reflected in law
and social practice are essential to the well-being of society.78 The result
is an unwillingness on the part of many proponents of same-sex marriage
and reproductive freedom to allow religious exemptions with significant
public effects, and a corresponding unwillingness on the part of many
religious believers to grant concessions to progressive agendas in
exchange for religious protections. There has been little give and take,
little willingness to live and let live, and much conflict.
However, this dynamic rests on too narrow an understanding of the
common good. In a political society with the freedoms and democratic
institutions that the Church has long championed,79 there will be moral
disagreement. We cannot expect the legal or social order to fully match
our views about marriage, family, and sexuality or any other human good,
and we need to make room for one another. Human dignity requires space
for the exercise of human freedom. Sometimes we will exercise it well,
sometimes we will not, and sometimes it will be hard to tell whether we
have exercised it rightly or not. Space for freedom means space for error.
Democratic institutions undergird political stability and provide a fair
method for resolving conflicts in conditions of pluralism. They also, as
Pope John Paul II wrote, fit human dignity by “ensur[ing] the
participation of citizens in making political choices.”80 Democracies
require a commitment to give and take. They depend on civic trust and
friendship; a willingness to listen to one another and to dialogue about
differences; and a determination to seek solutions that are multi-sided,
not one-sided. Democracies provide citizens with the opportunity to
77. See id. at 1804–05; Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of
Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467–68 (1990).
78. For this view in Catholic social thought, see SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET
SPES, supra note 24, para. 47, at 195; POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS IN VERITATE, supra note 42,
para. 15, at 23, para. 28, at 42–43, para. 44, at 71–72, para. 51, at 82–83.
79. Catholic social thought strongly affirms democratic systems and institutions. See, e.g., POPE
JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 39, para. 46, at 67; POPE BENEDICT XVI, CARITAS
IN VERITATE, supra note 42, para. 41, at 64–65. For the Church’s support of human rights, see infra
notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
80. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 39, para. 46, at 67.
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promote their visions of the human good at the level of society, not just
in their personal lives, and this is to be expected and welcomed. However,
we will not always win, and when we do not prevail, we should respect
the outcome even as there must always be space for dissent.
There is a connection between peace and justice, the Church has
taught,81 and justice entails the protection of human rights and
freedoms.82 Religious freedom is the highest of human rights, but it does
not exhaust our rights. Moral freedom is also a requirement of human
dignity,83 and we also have other rights, such as rights to the social and
economic prerequisites for free and meaningful choice in matters of the
mind and spirit.84 Our culture wars will not end without protections for
religious believers to follow the demands of their faith in society and in
their institutions. However, they also will not end if protections for
religious liberty do not take into account the interests of others whose
freedom has led them to different views about the nature of marriage and
family.
When and how to compromise requires discernment, and it depends on
the particular conflict involved and the limits of what is realistic and
practicable.85 For example, in conflicts regarding same-sex marriage, we
might be able to come closer together if conservative religious believers,
on the one hand, concede the legitimacy of same-sex marriage as a civil
institution reflecting both the exercise of human freedom and the reality
of families built on such unions; and if proponents of same-sex marriage,
on the other, accept the existence of moral disagreement on this issue and,
indeed, the consistency of this disagreement with America’s long and
valued tradition of religious pluralism. In this conflict, we might find that
we hold many goods in common, and if we do, we might find that our
disagreements are narrower than they seem today.
For instance, we might agree that religious groups must have the
freedom to make hiring decisions that reflect religious principle and
doctrine, including when these groups are engaged in charitable work for
81. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS, supra note 39, paras. 8–27, at 132–35.
83. See SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 24, paras. 16–17, at 174–
75.
84. See id. para. 26, at 181, para. 31, at 184; see also POPE JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS,
supra note 39, paras. 8–27, at 132–35.
85. Practical moral reasoning must always take into account concrete facts and circumstances
and the limits of what is possible and feasible. For example, these considerations influenced John
Courtney Murray’s recommendation that Catholics support the decriminalization of artificial
contraception in Massachusetts. See Memorandum from John Courtney Murray, S.J. on
Contraception Legislation to Cardinal Cushing (1965), available at https://www.library.
georgetown.edu/woodstock/murray/1965f.
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the common good, and even when their charitable work benefits from
public funds. The freedom of religious groups to hire in accordance with
religious principle is essential to their ability to maintain their unique
witness, and this witness has always been a valuable component of
American pluralism. For their part, Catholic and other religious groups
that have resisted extending health care coverage and other benefits to the
spouses of employees in same-sex unions might come to see such benefits
as reflecting a legitimate legal relationship though not a religious one.86
They might even view such benefits as part of a responsibility to care for
employees and those whom they support.
When it comes to protections for individual religious believers who do
not want to engage in actions that facilitate same-sex marriages, we might
agree that no one should be compelled to affirm views about same-sex
marriage with which they disagree. Most small business owners offering
wedding-related services that are closely linked to marriage celebrations
do not view the provision of their services as an affirmation of the
marriage involved. There are many other ways to see it; for example, as
something morally neutral, or a gesture of reciprocity in a pluralistic
community, or even as an occasion for Christian witness. Indeed, there
have been very few—though highly publicized—cases brought by
wedding vendors who refuse to serve same-sex couples. However, some
small business owners do view it as an affirmation of the marriage,
particularly where they are personally involved in customizing services
that celebrate the marriage87 or hosting the wedding itself.88 These views
86. See William Wan, Same-Sex Marriage Leads Catholic Charities to Adjust Benefits, WASH.
POST (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/01/
AR2010030103345_pf.html, for a discussion of the decision of Catholic Charities of the
Archdiocese of Washington to stop providing health care benefits to the spouses of new employees
or new health plan enrollees in order to avoid being penalized for denying benefits to the spouses
of gay employees. Other Catholic groups have extended benefits to the spouses of gay employees.
Oralandar Brand-Williams, Catholic Conference Offering Benefits for Gay Employees, DETROIT
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/03/07/
catholic-gay-employees-benefits/81459026/; Joan Frawley Desmond, Spousal Benefits for SameSex Partners at Catholic Universities and Hospitals, NAT’L CATH. REG. (Oct. 20, 2014),
http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/spousal-benefits-for-same-sex-partners-at-catholicsuniversities-and-hospit.
87. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(custom cake design); Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2018) (custom artwork for weddings), petition for review granted, No. CV-18-0176-PR (Ariz. Nov.
20, 2018); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013) (wedding photography),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014); Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543 (Wash.
2017) (custom floral arrangements), petition for cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
88. See, e.g., Odgaard v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CVCV046451 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk
Cty. Apr. 3, 2014) (art gallery used to plan, facilitate, and host wedding ceremonies); Country Mill
Farms, LLC v. City of East Lansing, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (W.D. Mich. 2017) (farm hosting
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are not unreasonable, and compelling those who hold them to endorse a
position with which they disagree is inconsistent with our commitment to
pluralism and to free exercise and free speech values we all share.
Accommodations in these circumstances should be made at least as long
as same-sex couples have ready access to comparable services from other
providers.89 Burdens on same-sex couples can be minimized by requiring
objectors to provide notice of their policies and by developing resources
that enable same-sex couples to easily identify willing providers.
If religious believers concede the validity of same-sex marriage as a
civil institution, other conflicts involving individual believers could be
resolved by reevaluating prior demands. For example, religious believers
might revisit demands that government employees be excused from
actions that facilitate same-sex marriages, such as the provision of
marriage licenses or even the solemnization of same-sex marriages.90 In
this context, what is involved is a clearly civil institution. Actions in the
course of one’s employment as a government official signal the
legitimacy of same-sex marriage as a legal institution, but they usually
say nothing about its permissibility as a religious matter or as a matter of
sexual morality.91 It is hard to predict what compromises might emerge
wedding ceremonies); Gifford v. McCarthy, 23 N.Y.S.3d 422 (App. Div. 2016) (same).
89. A number of scholars have advocated this compromise. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C.
Berg, Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to Democratic Representatives, Minn.
Legislature (May 3, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mn-short-letter-pdf---d-1.pdf;
Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to Republican
Representatives, Minn. Legislature (May 3, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mn-shortletter-pdf---r.pdf; Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al.,
to Representatives, Minn. Legislature (May 2, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mnmain-letter-pdf-1.pdf.
90. For analyses of these conflicts, see, for example, KENT GREENAWALT, EXEMPTIONS:
NECESSARY, JUSTIFIED, OR MISGUIDED? 174–77 (2016); TEBBE, supra note 60, at 164–81; Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y 274 (2010); Wilson, supra note 4, at 163–64; Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of
Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between
Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 1480–85 (2012); Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage
Laws, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318 (2010) [hereinafter Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens]; Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare
Context, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 77, 97–100
(Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Wilson, Matters of Conscience].
91. Indeed, clerks, magistrates, justices of the peace, and other government officials often
facilitate marriages that comply with legal requirements but depart from their own religious and
moral standards. My point here is not that governments should reject conscientious refusals when
objections are made. Indeed, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may require accommodation
in many circumstances. Title VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination in employment requires
employers to reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees when accommodation
will not result in undue hardship for them, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a) (2012), and these
protections apply to government officials who are not elected, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-16c(a).
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from a process of give and take where both sides carefully examine what
they really need and take into account the freedom of others, and the lines
that are drawn would probably evolve over time. The possibilities I have
suggested are meant to illustrate how the parties might move closer
together. They are not necessarily made as recommendations or
predictions. Actual compromises will depend on a lot of factors that are
hard to anticipate in advance.
With respect to the contraceptive mandate, there have always been
many ways to ensure that women receive cost-free contraceptives without
involving religious employers. When the Supreme Court in Zubik v.
Burwell called upon religious plaintiffs and federal regulators to explore
the possibility of a mutually acceptable solution to conflicts over the
mandate in May of 2016,92 religious groups came forth with a number of
detailed new proposals designed to ensure access to contraceptive
coverage with minimal burdens on women and insurers and little or no
additional cost to the government.93 These proposals did not call for the
seamless coverage of contraceptives favored by mandate proponents, but
they outlined forms of coverage that would require few, if any, steps for
women to activate or enroll in. In the waning days of the Obama
administration, federal regulators rejected all of these proposals, and
suggested that even minor additional burdens on women or insurers were

Robin Fretwell Wilson has persuasively argued that accommodations can often be made for
government employees who do not want to facilitate same-sex marriages with minimal burdens.
See Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens, supra note 90, at 335–38, 347–60. My argument here is that
conservative religious believers should carefully examine what accommodations they need in these
and other circumstances, and accepting the legitimacy of same-sex marriage as a civil institution
can reshape how religious traditionalists see their needs in ways that make greater compromise
possible.
92. Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016). In Zubik, the Court vacated the judgments
of the lower courts in a set of cases brought by religious nonprofits challenging the adequacy of the
government’s accommodation, and it remanded the cases to afford the parties an opportunity to
reach a mutually acceptable solution. Id.
93. These proposals were in response to a Request for Information issued by the government
after Zubik was decided. Coverage for Contraceptive Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,741 (July 22, 2016).
For some of these proposals, see Diocese of Erie Comments on Coverage for Contraceptive
Services in Response to the Request for Information CMS-9931-NC (Sept. 15, 2016); Diocese of
Pittsburgh Comments on Coverage for Contraceptive Services in Response to the Request for
Information, CMS-9931-NC (Sept. 19, 2016); Diocese of Pittsburgh & David S. Stewart Comments
on Coverage for Contraceptive Services in Response to the Request for Information CMS-9931NC (Sept. 20, 2016); Michigan Catholic Conference Comments on Coverage for Contraceptive
Services in Response to the Request for Information CMS-9931-NC (Sept. 20, 2016); Archdiocese
of Washington, Catholic University of America & Thomas Aquinas College, Comments on
Request for Information on Alternative Ways to Provide Contraceptive Services (CMS-9931-NC)
(Sept. 20, 2016). See also United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Office of the General
Counsel, Comments on Coverage for Contraceptive Services, CMS-9931-NC (Sept. 9, 2016). For
these and other comments, see https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=CMS-2016-0123.
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disqualifying.94 Catholic and evangelical leaders, for their part, also lost
interest in favor of the one-sided rules we now have. This was
unfortunate.
Religious believers need not concede the merits of the contraceptive
mandate to see it as a legitimate outcome of the political process and to
see the value of a solution that balances this outcome with religious
needs. The Trump administration’s new rules may seem like a victory,
but their concentration on religious concerns ensures that our conflicts
over the mandate will continue. These new rules have been challenged in
a number of lawsuits,95 and regardless of the ultimate outcome of these
lawsuits, the missed opportunity for a more balanced solution will leave
conservative religious believers vulnerable once again if the political
winds change in a few years. Moreover, unilateral solutions to conflicts
over religious freedom undermine the community’s broader commitment
to religious liberty. They make religious liberty seem to be something that
belongs only to believers and not to the common good. They send a signal
that political power is to benefit the victors and not also other segments
of our pluralistic community. None of this is good for religious freedom
in the long run or the broader common good.
There are other situations where there will be less room for opposing
parties to work together. For example, when it comes to abortion,
abortion opponents will not want to concede the recognition of the right
and will be reluctant to support policies that promote greater access and
availability in exchange for stronger conscience protections for those who
object to assisting or facilitating it. Disagreements over abortion
implicate matters of human life, not just any policy differences or even
any important policy differences. Those who believe that abortion
involves the destruction of innocent human life will not concede freedom
over this choice, and they will resist political outcomes that make this
choice easier.96 However, even here there can be important areas of
94. See FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36, at 4 (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/acapart-36.pdf.
95. In December 2017, two United States district courts, one in Pennsylvania and a second in
California, issued preliminary injunctions enjoining the administration from enforcing its interim
final rules. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553, 560 (E.D. Penn. 2017), appeals filed, No.
17-3752 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2017), and No. 18-1253 (3d Cir. Feb. 15, 2018); California v. Health &
Human Servs., 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 813–14 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, California v. Azar, 2018 WL 6566752 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2018) (affirming preliminary
injunction insofar as it applies to California and other plaintiff states but vacating portion of
injunction barring enforcement of the rules nationwide). The Trump administration finalized its
new rules in November 2018, and the plaintiffs in these cases now plan to challenge the final rules.
96. A number of scholars have advocated compromises that balance conscience protection with
policies to protect access to abortion. See Lynn D. Wardle, Protection of Health-Care Providers’
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compromise. For example, it should be possible to balance strong
conscience protections with safeguards for women in emergency
situations.97 These situations are relatively rare, but they have taken on
an outsized place in current fights over conscience protections, and they
have contributed to a growing pushback against these protections.98
This pushback, which has prioritized access to abortion, is regrettable.
For many years, opponents and proponents of legalizing abortion have
lived with an uneasy but workable truce. The right coexists with a variety
of federal and state conscience protections for health care providers who
do not want to assist or facilitate abortion.99 The outer limits of these
protections have always been the subject of debate,100 but in recent years,
proponents of abortion rights have been pushing back more strongly and
even with respect to core protections when they impede access to
abortion.101
Rights of Conscience in American Law: Present, Past, and Future, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 45–
46 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change:
What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 703, 745–49, 758–64 (2014); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Unpacking the Relationship
Between Conscience and Access, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 60, at 242–43 [hereinafter Wilson, Unpacking the Relationship]. However, in practice, it will
be difficult to close the gap between what abortion opponents are willing to concede and what
proponents of abortion rights demand.
97. Indeed, the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services allow for
medical care necessary for saving the life of the mother even if the intervention can result in the
death of her unborn child. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS
DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES directive 47, at 19 (6th ed. 2018),
http://www.usccb.org/about/doctrine/ethical-and-religious-directives/upload/ethical-religiousdirectives-catholic-health-service-sixth-edition-2016-06.pdf. For discussion, see Angela C.
Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-Legal Compromise,
120 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 71–72 (2017). Catholic hospitals have also transferred patients where
abortion might be required to protect the health or life of mothers. See Wilson, Unpacking the
Relationship, supra note 96, at 254.
98. See Carmella, supra note 97, at 71; Wilson, Unpacking the Relationship, supra note 96, at
254–55.
99. For overviews of these protections, see Wardle, supra note 96, at 27–45; Wilson, Matters
of Conscience, supra note 90, at 82–86, 90–91, 299–310; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Essay, The Limits
of Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED.
41, 48–52 (2008). In January 2018, the Trump administration proposed new regulations designed
to strengthen enforcement of federal conscience protections. Protecting Statutory Conscience
Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority, 83 Fed. Reg. 3880 (proposed Jan. 26, 2018) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 88).
100. See Angela C. Carmella, When Businesses Refuse to Serve for Religious Reasons: Drawing
Lines Between “Participation” and “Endorsement” in Claims of Moral Complicity, 69 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1593, 1598–1600 (2017); NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 20, at 2538–41; Wilson, supra
note 99, at 57–58.
101. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Healthcare Exemptions and the Future of Corporate Religious
Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 49 at 305, 318–21. An
increase in mergers and acquisitions involving Catholic hospitals has contributed to this pushback.
Id. at 312–14, 320.
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This is a mistake. Our tug of war over the availability of abortion will
continue, but requiring individuals and institutions with religious and
moral objections to abortion to provide or facilitate it benefits no one in
the long run. Forcing a betrayal of conscience over what many view as
murder is inconsistent with human dignity, and it undermines moral
integrity. In a democratic society, we all depend on the moral integrity of
our fellow citizens. There are other ways to increase access to abortion,
and proponents of abortion rights should focus their efforts on them.
In all of these contexts, the reminder in Dignitatis Humanae that we
must treat others with humanity when pursuing our rights is especially
important. The Christian faith teaches that one’s opponents are not one’s
enemies. They are persons who are pursued by a divine love so profound
that it suffered the Cross. Christians are called to model this love and to
share its good news. To do this requires a genuine openness to the other,
to hearing things from their point of view, to speaking in ways that can
be understood, and to learning from others. These are not just democratic
values; they are also Christian values.102 Culture wars and related fights
over religious liberty are a sign that something is wrong. We should not
be talking about fighting with people over religious liberty. It is the wrong
metaphor, sets the wrong tone, and sends the wrong message. If, finally,
culture warriors finish by mowing down their opponents, they will not
have won. They will have lost what is most important.
We are used to talking about religious freedom in terms of rights, and
I have done so here. However, our tradition has always been deeper than
that. When James Madison strengthened the protections for free exercise
in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights, he kept the admonition that “it is the
mutual duty of all to practi[c]e Christian forbearance, love, and charity,
towards each other.”103 Later, in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments, Madison linked these virtues to civic
peace and harmony.104 Dignitatis Humanae calls for the exercise of
similar virtues. “The love of Christ urges [us] to treat with love, prudence
and patience those who are in error or ignorance with regard to the faith,”
the Council reminds us.105 Without these virtues, we will not have peace,
and we are unlikely to change minds. The highest part of human dignity,
Pope John Paul II observed frequently in his social encyclicals, is our
102. See SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 24, para. 28, at 182;
SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 25, para. 3, at 801; POPE JOHN
PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 39, paras. 49–50, at 73; see also POPE FRANCIS,
LAUDATO SI’, supra note 39, para. 47, at 21, para. 81, at 39.
103. Madison, supra note 46, at 175.
104. See MADISON, supra note 36, at 302–03.
105. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 25, para. 14, at 811.
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openness to a relationship with a loving and merciful Creator who calls
us to imitate his love in self-giving.106 For Christians, this is what
religious freedom is for, and when religious freedom is pursued in a way
that clouds this truth, it becomes self-defeating. The common good
requires strong protections for the right of religious freedom; but it also
requires us to think carefully about how we exercise this right. Our
ultimate goal is not the protection of our freedom, but the use of this
freedom in love and service to God and others.
V. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE PROMOTION OF THE BROADER
COMMON GOOD
If we can somehow move from fights about religious liberty to
dialogue and good faith engagement grounded in mutual understanding,
this de-escalation could serve as a model and a sign of hope for reducing
our political polarizations more generally. This is yet another facet of the
relationship between religious freedom and the common good: the
potential that rethinking this relationship has for promoting the common
good even more broadly. President Trump’s unexpected victory placed
the ball in the court of religious conservatives, who now wield
considerable power in his administration. This power presents an
opportunity for those who felt under attack during the Obama
administration to reach out to their opponents to seek fair and balanced
solutions to conflicts over religious liberty. However, so far, the ball has
been fumbled. For the most part, religious leaders have followed the same
well-worn paths focused on protecting their own rights rather than
reaching out to others of good will to try to overcome some of our
society’s deepest divisions. As today’s polarization pits Americans
against one another and undermines our civic life, religious believers
have the opportunity to forge a new path that focuses on the common
good, but will they take it? It is late in the game, but I think there is still
time.

106. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, REDEMPTOR HOMINIS para. 10, at 18–19 (Pauline Books &
Media) (1979); POPE JOHN PAUL II, DIVES IN MISERICORDIA para. 1, at 7–9, para. 14, at 41–46
(Pauline Books & Media) (1980); see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS para.
40, reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE, supra note 24, at
395, 423.

